

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02858 01 OF 02 231222Z

43

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 IO-14

OMB-01 OC-06 CCO-00 DRC-01 EB-11 NEA-14 /138 W

----- 011642

R 231145Z MAY 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5860

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

USCINCEUR

OFFICE OF PREPAREDNESS GSA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2858

E.O. 11652: GDS 12/31/80

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJ: SURVIVABILITY OF THE NATO HEADQUARTERS - AD HOC COMMITTEE
MEETING MAY 21, 1974

REF: USNATO 1093

SUMMARY. AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE NATO HQ, CHAIRED BY DSYG PANSA, HELD FIRST MEETING ON MAY 21. MANY ALLIES ARE OPPOSED TO ANY RELOCATION ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT AS A LAST RESOR, AND MOST ALLIES FEEL THAT A FEASIBILITY STUDY ON PROVIDING PROTECTION AT EVERE IS ESSENTIAL TO DETERMINE THE COSTS INVOLVED. THE US IS ISOLATED IN OPPOSING PROTECTION AT EVERE, OR A STUDY ON THE SUBJECT, A QUESTION TO WHICH CON-

TINENTIAL EUROPEAN ALLIES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE. THE COMMUNICATIONS AT ANY POSSIBLE RELOCATION SITE ON THE CONTINENT COMPARED TO PROTECTION AT EVERE. MISSION BELIEVES THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES COULD PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION.
END SUMMARY.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 02858 01 OF 02 231222Z

1. AD HOC COMMITTEE ON SURVIVABILITY OF THE NATO HQ HELD FIRST MEETING MAY 21, CHAIRED BY DSYG PANSA AND CONSISTING OF DEPUTY PERMREPS. THIS COMMITTEE WAS FORMED BY COUNCIL ON FEB 27, 1974 AS RESULT OF US PROPOSAL TO CONSIDER VARIOUS

RELOCATION OPTIONS. REFTEL REFERS.

2. CHAIRMAN OPENED WITH REMINDER THAT AD HOC COMMITTEE HAD BEEN INVITED TO REPORT BACK TO COUNCIL BY JULY 1. HE THEN PROPOSED THAT THE COMMITTEE ORGANIZE ITS WORK BY (1) REVIEWING PROPOSALS AS ADVANCED BY THE COUNCIL OPERATIONS AND EXERCISE COMMITTEE (C-M(73)106); (2) CONSIDERING US RELOCATION PROPOSALS; (3) SEEKING TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES; AND (4) PREPARING A REPORT FOR THE COUNCIL WITH RECOMMENDATIONS AS APPROPRIATE. COMMITTEE ENDORSED THIS GENERAL APPROACH.

3. CHAIRMAN INVITED US REP (MCCULIFFE) TO LEAD OFF DISCUSSION.

US REP RESPONDED BY MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE US PROPOSAL TO FORM THIS COMMITTEE WAS TO PROVIDE MEANS TO EXAMINE PROBLEM IN A DIFFERENT WAY THAN PREVIOUSLY. THERE WAS

A CLEAR NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS AS WELL AS THE

TECHNICAL ASPECTS ALREADY COVERED IN THE COEC REPORT AT LENGTH AND IN GREAT DETAIL. FIRST OF ALL, THE QUESTION OF SURVIVABILITY OF NATO HQ IS, IN US VIEW, ONE OF PROVIDING FOR THE CONTINUITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL, DPC AND MC. THESE BASIC FUNCTIONS CENTER AROUND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSULTATION AMONG THE ALLIES. THE US COMMITMENT TO THIS PRINCIPLE IS AS STRONG AS THAT OF ANY OTHER NATION.

B. THIS STUDY HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PHYSICAL OBJECT, THE BUILDING THAT IS KNOWN AS NATO HQ. HARDENING THE EXISTING FACILITY AT EVERE IS NO WAY TO APPROACH THIS PROBLEM

AND, IN THE US VIEW, IS NOT A
DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVE.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 02858 01 OF 02 231222Z

C. THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF THE SITUATION MUST BE CONSIDERED. THE US COULD EXPECT DIFFICULTY IN EXPLAINING TO CONGRESS WHY FUNDS FOR HARDENING AT EVERE ARE REQUIRED NOW, IN 1974 ON NATO'S 25TH ANNIVERSARY, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT NO HARDENING WAS CONTEMPLATED IN PARIS NOR AT BRUSSELS DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR. PARLIAMENTARIANS IN OTHER CAPITALS MIGHT ADDRESS LIKE QUESTIONS TO OTHER ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. THIS MIGHT LEAD TO DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO CONTINUED DEFENSE, A COLLECTIVE PROGRAM TO WHICH THE US ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE. EVEN IF A FEASIBILITY STUDY WERE TO SHOW THAT THE PRICE FOR HARDENING NATO HQ IS MODEST, THE POLITICAL ISSUE REMAINS.

D. THE COMMITTEE MUST CONSIDER THE REACTION OF ALLIED PUBLICS

TO THE BELATED AND VISIBLE CONSTRUCTION OF A HARDENED SITE.
IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS' REACTION MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT,
ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF MBFR, CSCE, AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS
THAT HOPEFULLY WILL LEAD

TO REDUCED TENSION AND GREATER EAST/
WEST COOPERATION.

E. THE COMMITTEE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER CERTAIN FOLLOW-
ON QUESTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, HARDENING IS A FORM OF PASSIVE
AIR DEFENSE. WOULD INITIAL INVESTMENT IN PASSIVE DEFENSE AT

EVERE LEAD NATO TO CONSIDER SOME FORM OF ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE
AS WELL? THESE PROTECTIVE MEASURES COULD BETTER BE APPLIED
TO INSTALLATIONS OF MILITARY VALUE IN INCREASING DETERRENCE.

F. U.S. FORCES ARE STATIONED IN EUROPE TO IMPLEMENT THE
STRATEGY OF MC 14/3 AND THE NATO HQ MUST REMAIN IN EUROPE AND
FUNCTION IN EUROPE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, IT DOES
NOT FOLLOW THAT THOSE ESSENTIAL NATO FUNCTIONS CAN ONLY BE PER-
FORMED IN EVERE. THE ALLIES CAN CARRY OUT THE ESSENTIAL CONSULTATIVE
FUNCTIONS AT ANY ONE OF MANY LOCATIONS SO LONG AS THE
ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR RAPID, DEPENDABLE, SECURE COMMUNICA-
TIONS IS SATISFIED. NATO CAN PROVIDE FOR THESE COMMUNICATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 02858 01 OF 02 231222Z

FASTER AND AT MUCH LESS COST THAN WOULD BE INVOLVED IN
HARDENING AT EVERE. MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS AND A TIE-IN WITH
NICS, WHICH PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXPEDITED, COULD SATISFY THIS
REQUIREMENT.

G. THE US FEELS THAT OTHER NATO PRESSING NEEDS HAVE A
GREATER CLAIM TO LIMITED INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING. THE COM-
MITTEE SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT TRADE OFFS ARE CONTEMPLATED AND
WHAT NATO PROJECTS WOULD HAVE TO BE DEFERRED OR SCRAPPED TO
PROVIDE RESOURCES TO HARDEN OR PROTECT FACILITIES AT EVERE.

H. THE US HOPES ALLIES WILL LOOK AT THE ESSENTIAL
FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE NATO HQ AND EXAMINE HOW THESE CAN
BE PROVIDED BY VARIOUS RELOCATION OPTIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 02858 02 OF 02 231248Z

43
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 IO-14

OMB-01 OC-06 CCO-00 EB-11 DRC-01 NEA-14 /138 W

----- 011943

R 231145Z MAY 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5861
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT
USCINCEUR
OFFICE OF PREPAREDNESS GSA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 2858

4. ITALIAN REP (BETTINI) THEN ASKED IF THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE US GOVERNMENT ARE PROTECTED AND IF SUCH PROTECTION WOULD EXTEND TO A NATO HQ RELOCATED TO WASHINGTON. US REP RESPONDED THAT THIS ISSUE COULD BE EXAMINED BUT THAT OUR PRIMARY INTEREST LIES IN PROVIDING FOR ALTERNATE SITES IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE. RELOCATION OR RECONSTITUTION OF THE NAC IN NORTH AMERICA ARE SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS TO WHICH

THE COMMITTEE MIGHT TURN ITS ATTENTION AFTER PROVISIONS ARE MADE TO REMAIN IN EUROPE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. ITALIAN REP INDICATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FEELS NATO SHOULD REMAIN AT EVERE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND THEREFORE NATO HQ SHOULD HAVE SOME MEASURE OF PROTECTION. IN ADDITION, ITALY FEELS THAT RELOCATION PLANS SHOULD BE MADE IN THE EVENT EVERE WERE TO BECOME UNTENABLE AND THAT RELOCATION WITHIN EUROPE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A STEP BETWEEN EVERE AND POSSIBLE EVENTUAL RELOCATION TO NORTH AMERICA.

5. CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF COLLOCATING WITH SHAPE,
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 02858 02 OF 02 231248Z

THE DIRECTOR OF COUNCIL OPERATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS (AIR MARSHAL MACBRIEN) REPORTED THAT THIS OPTION WOULD INVOLVE EXPANDING SHAPE'S PROGRAMMED HARDNEED SITE TO ACCOMMODATE THE ADDITIONAL NATO HQ PERSONNEL, ESTIMATED TO BE 250 PERSONNEL PER SHIFT. THIS EXPANSION PROBABLY WOULD PROVE ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS COSTLY THAN CONSTRUCTION OF A SIMILAR FACILITY AT EVERE, PARTICULARLY IF EVERE'S SITE COULD BE CONSTRUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A POSSIBLE NICSMA BUILDING. MACBRIEN INDICATED THAT THE CRITERIA FOR SHAPE'S HARDENED WAR HQ HAD BEEN CHANGED TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST 2000 LB ARMOR PIERCING AND 5000 LB GENERAL PURPOSE BOMBS. THE BELGIAN (VAN ROEY) AND FRENCH (CARRAUD) REPS STATED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT SUPPORT A RELOCATION TO SHAPE IN ANY CASE.

6. BELGIAN REP WENT ON TO SAY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FEELS

STRONGLY THAT NATO MUST REMAIN AT EVERE FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE IN A CRISIS AND THAT PROVIDING A MEASURE OF PROTECTION IS THE ONLY ANSWER. NO SUITABLE PROTECTED RELOCATION SITES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED, AND A SHIFT TO AN UNPROTECTED LOCATION

WOULD NOT BE PRACTICABLE, ESPECIALLY DURING HOSTILITIES. HIS AUTHORITIES COULD ACCEPT THE ALTERNATIVE OF A RELOCATION OR RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH AMERICA, BUT ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH A PROTECTED SITE AT EVERE.

7. THE NETHERLANDS REP (BUWALDA) AGREED, AND POINTED OUT THAT NATO HQ NEED NOT BE PROTECTED TO THE SAME LEVEL AS SHAPE, BUT ONLY INsofar AS TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS AT EVERE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. HE THEN REFERRED TO THE US REP'S EARLIER STATEMENT AND EXPRESSED HIS OPINION THAT THE PUBLIC WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEY WERE TO REALIZE THAT NATO HAD NO PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT EVERE. FURTHER THE SOVIETS WOULD REGARD THIS PROTECTION AS A NORMAL PRECAUTION AND THAT COORDINATION WITH A NICSMA SITE WOULD REDUCE THE IMPACT. THE NETHERLANDS REP EMPHASIZED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE HIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO PROVIDING A MEASURE OF PROTECTION AT EVERE AND STATED THAT NO OTHER SUITABLE SITES EXIST IN EUROPE. FURTHER, HIS AUTHORITIES DO NOT BELIEVE IN THE MOBILE HEAD-QUARTERS PROPOSAL AS ADVANCED BY THE US.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 02858 02 OF 02 231248Z

8. FRG (OOSS), UK (STAPLES), CANADIAN (ROY), AND FRENCH REPS TOOK THE SAME GENERAL POSITION. ALL FELT THAT THE COMMITTEE SHOULD HAVE THE BENEFIT OF SOME COMPARATIVE COST FIGURES BEFORE AN INTELLIGENT RECOMMENDATION TO THE COUNCIL COULD BE MADE. CHAIRMAN ASKED MACBRIEN IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COME UP WITH SOME COST ESTIMATE BASED ON SHAPE AND NICSMA STUDIES. MACBRIEN INDICATED HE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS POSSIBILITY AND ASKED IF US WERE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN FUNDING A STUDY ON COST AND FEASIBILITY OF MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS FOR US RELOCATION PROPOSALS. US REP REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING SUCH A STUDY.

9. DURING A GENERAL RESTATEMENT OF POSITIONS, US REP AGAIN POINTED TO THE EVIDENT DIFFERENCES IN VIEWING THE PROBLEM. HE AGREED WITH THE ITALIAN REP'S POSITION THAT NATO SHOULD HAVE A CONTINGENCY PLAN TO RELOCATE ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE SHOULD OPERATIONS AT EVERE BECOME IMPRACTICAL. EXPECTED ADVANCES IN SOVIET TARGETING ABILITY BY USE OF SMART BOMBS, WOULD LIKELY RENDER EVERE UNTENABLE EARLY IN THE GAME WHETHER OR

NOT IT WAS HARDENED. COMMUNICATIONS FOR A RELOCATION SITE COULD BE PROVIDED BY NICS WITHIN THE TIME FRAME CONSIDERED FOR HARDENING AT EVERE. FINALLY, THE COMMITTEE MUST CONSIDER WHERE NATO CAN BEST APPLY ITS SCARCE INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING AND WHAT

MUST BE SACRIFICED TO PROTECT EVERE.

10. CHAIRMAN THEN SUGGESTED THAT COMMITTEE MIGHT FORM AN OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP TO LOOK INTO DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THIS IDEA WAS DROPPED WHEN SEVERAL REPS RESPONDED THAT THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE WAS AT A STAND-STILL UNTIL SOME COMPARATIVE COST FIGURES WERE AVAILABLE. CHAIRMAN ASKED US REP TO CONTACT WASHINGTON IN THIS REGARD WITH THE HOPE THAT US COULD SUPPORT A FEASIBILITY STUDY WHICH WOULD PROVIDE NECESSARY COST ANALYSIS. CHAIRMAN

TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED AD HOC COMMITTEE'S NEXT MEETING FOR NEXT WEEK BUT INDICATED THAT, IF NOTHING NEW DEVELOPED, IT MAY NOT BE HELD.

11. COMMENT. THIS MEETING PRODUCED LITTLE.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 02858 02 OF 02 231248Z

U.S. IS ISOLATED IN OPPOSING PROTECTION AT EVERE OR A FEASIBILITY STUDY ON THE SUBJECT. HOWEVER, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS LATER ON MAY 21, THE UK PERMREP (PECK), THE TURKISH PERMREP (ERALP) AND THE FRG DEPUTY PERMREP (BOSS) APPROACHED US DEPUTY PERMREP (MCAULIFFE) AND EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THE US FAVORED ALTERNATE RELOCATION SITES IN EUROPE. THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US WAS COMMITTED TO IMMEDIATE RELOCATION/RECONSTITUTION IN NORTH AMERICA AS SOON AS EVERE BECAME UNTENABLE.

12. USNATO NOW PLANS TO MAKE INFORMAL INQUIRIES LOCALLY TO LEARN WHETHER MILITARY COMMITTEE OR OTHER NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES ARE ABLE TO DETERMINE AVAILABILITY AND COST OF MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WITHOUT REPEAT WITHOUT RESORTING TO FEASIBILITY STUDY.MCAULIFFE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO02858
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS 12/31/80
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740587/abbryvck.tel
Line Count: 307
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 1093
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <05 APR 2002 by cunninfx>; APPROVED <12 JUN 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SURVIVABILITY OF THE NATO HEADQUARTERS - AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETING MAY 21, 1974
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
USCINCEUR
OFFICE OF PREPAREDNESS GSA
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005